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Comments
SEC RULE 147-DISTILLING SUBSTANCE FROM
THE SPIRIT OF THE INTRASTATE EXEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Securities Act of 19331 provided for the protection of inves-
tors by requiring issuers and dealers in securities to disclose to pro-
spective purchasers certain fundamental and reliable information
concerning the nature of those securities. 2 The Congress seized
broad jurisdiction3 but chose to leave certain transactions within
the control of the states.4 Among these exceptions to federal con-
trol, Section 3(a) (11),5 slightly altered by amendment today, ex-
empts from the registration requirements of Section 56 the follow-
ing:
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold
only to persons resident within a single State or Territory,
where the issuer of such Security is a person resident and
1. The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act].
2. In his message to Congress, March 29, 1933, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt recommended enactment of the Securities Act with this charge:
"There is however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element at-
tending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public." H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
3. Section 5(a) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970) made unlawful the "use of any means of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails" for the offer
or sale of any security, unless such security was registered with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and was accompanied by or preceded by a
prospectus of a designated type.
4. Section 3 of the Securities Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970),
exempts from the provisions of the Act certain classes of securities. Section
4 of the Securities Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970), exempts certain
transactions from the registration requirement of Section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1970).
5. The Securities Act, adding 48 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Section 3(a) (11)].
6. Section 5 of the Securities Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(1970).
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doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by
and doing business within, such State or Territory.
7
This so-called "intrastate" exemption provides a substantial
benefit to the qualifying issuer, in that he may avoid the time-con-
suming, expensive and complex problem of registration.8 This ad-
vantage has attracted numerous issuers over the years to utilize
the exemption of 3(a) (11). 9
A provision of such widespread use demands firm statutory cri-
teria for its application. Yet such criteria have in the past proven
nonexistent. Among the several conditions for the availability of
the exemption, only its exclusive residence requirement for pur-
chasers has demonstrated even the semblance of substance.
The legislative history evidences no emphatic guidelines for the
application of the intrastate exemption. 10 Several commentators
have expressed the opinion that Congress meant thereby to exempt
from federal registration the broad group of securities transactions
which were already being effectively administered by the states,
even though the issuers of some of these were not of strictly local
character. 1 The Securities and Exchange Commission, however,
has effected several arguments to substantiate a narrow construc-
tion of the exemption, thereby broadening federal jurisdiction in
the securities field.1 2 The Commission has argued, first, that util-
7. The Securities Act, adding 48 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(1) (11) (1970).
8. A typical SEC registration for a new issue costs approximately
$100,000.00, including the costs of accounting and printing. 'Emens &
Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 in 1971, 40
U. CiN. L. Rav. 779, 783 (1971).
9. Because the exemption is not conditioned on the prior approval of
the Commission, no precise figures are available; however, one manual
listed at least ninety offerings presumably made pursuant to the exemption
in 1961 alone, fifteen of which were for amounts of a million dollars or
more. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANa COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY
OF SECURITIES MARXET, H.R. Doc. No. 91, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 570, 573
(1963).
10. See note 15 infra.
11. Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act
of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 779, 781 (1971); McCauley, Intrastate Se-
curities Transactions under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
937, 962 (1959).
12. By Section 19(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970),
the Commission's rule-making is restricted largely to interpretation and
definition: "[The SEC may promulgate] such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title, including rules and
regulations ... defining accounting, technical and trade terms used in this
title." Even in the absence of narrow interpretations by the Commission,
the courts are bound to construe exemptions under the Act very narrowly.
SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold
Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938); SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343
F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1972).
ization of federal controls is always permissible where necessary
to insure protection of the investing public. This position is exem-
plified in the Commission referee's opinion in In re Brooklyn Man-
hattan Transit Corporation'8 in which it is stated that, "[ob-
viously, an act designed to afford regulatory protection for inves-
tors in connection with the distribution of new security issues de-
mands that its various component provisions should be construed
in harmony with its general purpose.' 4 Second, although the stat-
ute does not specify that the issuer must in any respect confine
his business activities to the local arena of commerce, the SEC has
seized upon two indirect references supporting such a proposition15
to infer that the issuer, "as well as purchaser must be narrowly
limited to activities substantially within a single state."' 6
The uncertainty resulting from these and other interpretative
anomalies concerning the primary concepts of the exemption, such
as "part of an issue," "doing business" and the residence require-
ment, has inspired hesitancy among the most seasoned veterans of
the securities bar to recommend the exemption and has led an SEC
chairman to describe the provision as "loaded with dynamite."'
7
The situation was rendered all the more hazardous by the substan-
tial liability of the issuer who, having distributed securities in good
faith pursuant to 3(a) (11), is shown in retrospect to have violated
the terms of the exemption. If he fails to support his burden of
proving its availability, he loses the exemption for the entire issue,
and he may be made to rescind sales of any securities which con-
stitute part of that issue.' 8 Furthermore, his claim that violative
sales have terminated provides no defense.19 Even where no pur-
13. 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
14. Id. at 161.
15. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933) described H.R. 5480,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), a proposal nearly identical to Section 5(c) (later
Section 3 (a) (11)), as exempting "sales within a State of the entire issue
of local issuers [emphasis supplied]." However, the Conference Report on
the bill as finally recommended and enacted contains no specific reference
to this section. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
In discussing the 1934 amendment, 48 Stat. 906 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77c (a) (11) (1970), Representative Sam Rayburn explained Section
3(a) (11) thus: "An exception is made in unregistered securities of com-
panies predominantly intrastate in character." [emphasis supplied] 78
CoNC. REc. 10269 (1934).
16. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-1459, 17 C.F.R. § 231.1459 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as Release 1459]. See also Throop & Lane, Some Prob-
lems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAw & CONTEM P.
PRoa. 89,108 (1937) (Mr. Throop was, at the time he wrote the article, Gen-
eral Counsel to SEC); SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, 26 F.R. §
11896 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Release 4434].
17. Gadsby, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financ-
ing of Small Businesses, 14 Bus. LAW. 144, 148 (1958).
18. Securities Act, Section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970). The lia-
bility extends beyond the issuer to include any seller. See Cady v. Murphy,
113 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1940). Any purchaser has status to sue. Larson v.
Tony's Investments, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,324 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
19. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 276 F.2d 665, 668 (1st Cir. 1960).
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chaser seeks recission, the issuer may be forced to rescind prior sales
and to undergo a Section 5 registration in order to obtain needed
financing without SEC intervention.20
For these reasons commentators have stood ready to eulogize
Section 3(a)(11);21 indeed, several unsuccessful bills have from
time to time been introduced to eliminate the exemption. 22 Re-
cently, the SEC has released first a proposal, 23 then a final draft
for an extensive rule 24 "intended to provide more objective stand-
ards upon which responsible local businessmen intending to raise
capital from local sources may rely in claiming the Section 3 (a) (11)
exemption.
25
This Comment is intended to compare the provisions of this
new Rule 147 with previous interpretations of the terms of the ex-
emption by the Commission and the court, to demonstrate what
effect the rule may have in the application of Section 3(a) (11).
I. APPLICABILITY OF THE RULE AND THE ACT COMPARED
Rule 147 provides in part:
20. See Schneider, The Intrastate Offering Exemption, in SECOND AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 22, 33 (R. Mundheim & A.
Fleischer, Jr. ed. 1971). In addition, even where the issuer legitimately
qualifies for the Section 3 (a) (11) exemption, and the jurisdictional require-
ments are met, he may remain liable to purchasers under the anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Act, Section 17 (c), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (c) (1970).
The issuer may gain provisional assurance of the availability of the ex-
emption by obtaining, upon presentation to the Commission of the facts per-
tinent to his distribution, a "no-action letter." Such a letter typically states
that, given the adequacy and accuracy of the facts presented, the Division
of Corporate Finance will not presently recommend to the Commission any
remedial action.
21. If the offering is not over $300,000.00, an exemption will be
available in most cases pursuant to § 3(b), with none of the risk
inherent in § 3 (a) (11). And, if the offering is larger, it is difficult
to see how the very restrictive conditions of § 3(a) (11) can be sat-
isfied unless the entire issue is placed with a relatively few people
for investment, in which event the exemption for private offerings
under the first clause of § 4(1) will be available without regard
to the residence of the issuer or the purchaser.
1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATiONS 602 (2d ed. 1961). "In a proposed public
intrastate distribution, the lawyer must necessarily sound like an oracle of
doom." Sosin, The Intrastate Exemption: Public Offerings and the Issue
Concept, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 110, 130 (1964).
22. H.R. 572, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 1218, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); H.R. 884, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 11050, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958).
23. Securities Act Release No. 5349 (January 8, 1973), [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,168.
24. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rule 147; Rule
147 became effective March 1, 1974], adopted at SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5450 (January 7, 1974).
25. Rule 147.
(a) Transactions covered.
Offers, offers to sell, offers for sale and sales by an
issuer2 6 of its securities made in accordance with all
of the terms and conditions of this rule. .... 27
The rule thus treats Section 3(a) (11) as setting forth an ex-
empted transaction, despite its placement by Congress with ex-
empted securities in Section 3. This paradox is the result of the
intrastate exemption's prodigious historical development from its
origin as a modest technicality to its present full-fledged exemption
status.
Initially, in the Securities Act of 1933, it was designated Section
5(c) 28 and constituted not a broad exemption from the operation
of the Act, such as Sections 3 and 4 provide, 29 but merely an ex-
ception to the provision forbidding use of the mails for an offer
or sale of unregistered securities. Section 5(c) related only to an
original issuer of securities. 30  The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Title 11,31 repealed this section, revised it and reinserted it
as Section 3(a) (11). By virtue of its rewording, the new section
permitted the use of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
as well as the mails for the sales of securities falling thereunder.
32
26. Rule 147(a) provides in part: "The rule provides an exemption for
offers or sales by the issuer only." Section 3 (a) (11) applies to sales by any
party. Offers were disallowed under Section 3 (a) (11) by the Act of Aug.
10, 1954, 68 Stat. 684, amending the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11)
(1970). Sales of secruities are construed broadly under the Act to include
sales of options and the creation of any enforceable promise to deliver se-
curities. In re Texas Glass Manufacturing Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958);
In re Lawrence, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,424
(S.E.C. 1966).
In regard to offers, the SEC need not prove an offer was ever directed
to or received by a specific offeree in order to show a violation. A showing
that offering circulars have been circulated through the mails or out of state
or that advertisements have appeared in newspapers circulated out of state
without a'clear warning that the offer is limited to bona fide residents of
the issuer's residence state will create the presumption of a violation. SEC
v. Dunfee, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. L. REP. 91,970 (W.D.
Mo. 1966); In re The Whitehall Corp., 38 S.E.C. 259, 268 (1958). Further-
more, the offeror has the burden of proving compliance with the Act.
SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D. Minn. 1972).
27. Rule 147(a).
28. The Securities Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1970),
provided:
(c) The provisions of this section [Section 5] relating to the use
of the mails shall not apply to the sale of any security where the
issue of which it is a part is sold only to persons resident within
a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such securities is a
person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, in-
corporated by and doing business within such State or Territory.
29. Securities qualifying for exemption under Section 4 are exempted
from registration under Section 5 of the Act; Section 3 securities are ex-
empted from all the provisions of the act except Section 17, which outlaws
fraudulent securities transactions conducted through use of the mails or the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
30. 17 C.F.R. 231.97 (k) (1973).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. In re Edsco Mfg. Co., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 865, 869 (1961).
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Furthermore, as a result of the placement of Section 3(a) (11)
within "Exempted Securities":
[I]t [was] made clear that securities entitled to exemption
on original issuance retain their exemption; if the issuer
is not obliged to register in order to make the original dis-
tribution, dealers within a year are subject to no restric-
tions against dealing in the securities. .... 33
Still, the SEC has contended, "[t] his amendment was not intended
to detract from [the exemption's] essential character as a transac-
tion exemption."3 4 Although its meaning is far from clear, this ref-
erence appears to have been intended obliquely to reinforce the
thrust of Release 4434,35 in which the quotation appeared, that sales
by underwriters to nonresidents will defeat the exemption even
though sales by dealers in certain circumstances may not.
Thus, Section 3(a)(11) is a hybrid. Although it provides no
truly general exemption for any class of securities, it nevertheless
exempts not one but a pot pourri of transactions, to wit: sales by an
issuer, or by a dealer after forty days from issue and secondary
distributions by controlling persons within an issuing corporation. 6
The significance of this applicability of 3(a) (11) to several types
of transactions comes to bear in considering the repercussions of
Rule 147. Before the inception of the new rule the several types of
sellers affected by Section 3 (a) (11), although they were not speci-
fically designated therein, were treated alike. The provisions of the
rule, however, apply for issuers only. Thus, the SEC has created a
dichotomy in the application of the intrastate exemption. Of those
sellers encompassed by the Act but not the rule, special provision
is made only for one group: "Controlling persons who want to offer
or sell securities pursuant to Section 3(a) (11) may continue to do
so in accordance with applicable judicial and administrative inter-
33. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1933). Section 4(3) (A)
of the Securities Act provided that transactions by a dealer no longer acting
as an underwriter would be exempted if they took place after the expiration
of one year from date of issue. This period was later reduced to forty days
by the Act of Aug. 10, 1954, ch. 667, Title I, § 6, 68 Stat. 684, 15 U.S.C. §
77d(3) (A). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) defines "dealer" thus: "The term 'dealer'
means any person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly
or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another
person."
34. Release 4434.
35. Release 4434 stated in part: "[Ilf during the course of distribution
an underwriter, [or] any distributing dealer ...were to offer or sell such
securities to a nonresident, the exemption would be defeated."
36. "Controlling person-one who possesses the direct or indirect
power to cause the direction of the management and policies of [an issuer]
pretations."' 1 The new dichotomy was evidently born of a desire
to excuse such controlling persons from the rigid residence require-
ments to which Rule 147 subjects issuers.38 However, another less
fortunate result in disputes involving secondary distributions by
controlling persons may be to remove the rule's lucid criteria for
determinations of what securities constitute an "issue," the defini-
tion of "doing business" and the limitations on resales under Sec-
tion 3(a) (11). Presumably, however, much of Rule 147 will provide
a fertile bed of analogy for any court faced with the phenomenon
of secondary distributions by controlling persons.
A like problem arises in cases of violative sales by an under-
writer 9 or a dealer within forty days of issue. In a dispute involv-
ing one of these, a damaged purchaser may be expected to join both
immediate seller and issuer as defendants. 40 Conceivably, con-
fusion may arise if the issuer claims the 3(a) (11) exemption via
Rule 147, while the seller is limited in his defense to previous ju-
dicial interpretations.
Rule 147 provides that its terms are to be applied conjunc-
tively.4 1 Significantly, however, compliance with these terms is not
an exclusive requirement for the availability of 3 (a) (11), even for
the issuer.42 Thus the issuer is given the option either to satisfy the
terms of the rule and enjoy a virtual guarantee of the exemption's
availability, or to chance the uncertainty which has heretofore
characterized the application of 3 (a) (11) by the SEC and the courts.
Rule 147 provides further that "nothing in this rule obviates
the need for compliance with any state law relating to the offer
and sale of securities." 43  This is in accordance with Section 18 of
the Act.44 In fact, since the Commission's rule-making power is
... R. FIOME & V. ROSENSWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE IN-
siERs 5 (1972). The Section 3 (a) (11) exemption is available to a control-
ling person in a secondary distribution without regard to his residence, so
long as the original issue would have qualified for the exemption. Release
4434. This concept is not to be confused with that of the joint liability of
controlling persons for violations by the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
37. Rule 147.
38. See Rule 147(c).
39. See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-201 (July 20, 1934), 1
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2255 (1973). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) provides in part:
"The term 'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an is-
suer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security, or participates in the underwriting of any such
undertaking ......
40. Release 1459.
41. Rule 147 provides in part: "All of the terms and conditions of the
rule must be satisfied in order for the rule to be available."
42. Rule 147 provides in part: "This rule shall not raise any presump-
tion that the exemption provided by Section 3(a) (11) of the Act is not
available for transactions by an issuer which do not satisfy all of the provi-
sions of the rule."
43. Rule 147.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970) provides in part: "Nothing in this title shall
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission ... of any State. .. ."
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limited in Section 19(a) 45 to the creation only of "such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
title, '48 it appears that the SEC has no authority to override Sec-
tion 18. Preservation of state jurisdiction receives special mention,
perhaps, as a reminder.
One related consideration of applicability under the Act which
is not treated in the Rule deserves mention.47 As discussed,
3(a) (11) was transposed from Section 5 where it stood as an excep-
tion to that section's denial of the use of the mails for the sale
of unregistered securities. The use of the mails is now solely impor-
tant as providing one of several disjunctive jurisdictional require-
ments for the operation of the Act as a whole.4 Nevertheless, mis-
conceptions as to the significance of the mails in the operation of
Section 3(a)(11) persist.4 Release 4434 states the SEC position,
as follows: "[T] he exemption is not dependent on the use of the
mails and it is immaterial that violative sales or resales are made
without the mails, where the jurisdictional requirement is met."50
On the other hand, in cases in which use of the mails does
supply the operative means for satisfying the federal jurisdictional
requirements, such use of the mails, whether or not interstate, es-
tablishes federal jurisdiction.61 These conclusions would seem to
apply, as well, to the applicability of Rule 147.
HI. WHo IS A RESIDENT PURCHASER?
Because even a single offer or sale to a nonresident defeats the
intrastate exemption for the entire issue,5 2 whether or not the viola-
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970).
46. Id. at paragraph (a).
47. An additional secondary consideration is that Section 3(a) (11) is
not available to issuers in the District of Columbia, although certain of its
advantages may be available to particular classes of D.C. issuers. See Se-
curity Act Release No. 4901 (April 15, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,548.
48. The other requirement is the use of the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
49. Release 4434.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 792. See also Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1942); 17 C.F.R. 231.97(j) (1973).
52. Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942); SEC v. Dunfee,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,970 (W.D. Mo.
1966); SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 87 (D.N.H. 1958),
permanent injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Hills-
borough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); In re Ned J. Bow-
man Co., 39 S.E.C. 879, 882 (1960); In re John Paul Hunt, 4 S.E.C. Jud. Dec.
788, 789 (1946).
tive sale itself exhibits the prerequisites for federal jurisdiction,5
it becomes important to understand who will be considered a resi-
dent.
Rule 147 provides, in essence, that offers and sales sought to
be exempted thereunder must be made only to residents of the state
or territory of which the issuer is a resident at the time of the
transaction. "Residence" for a corporation, partnership or trust is
deemed to be in the state or territory in which its principal office
is located. Additionally, a business organization which is created
specifically for the purpose of acquiring securities issued pursuant
to Rule 147 will only be deemed a resident of a state or territory
if all of its beneficial owners are residents. An individual's "princi-
pal residence" determines his residence under the rule.5 4
The individual residence requirement has been the subject of
little litigation. However, although authoritative interpretation is
scant, two precepts seemed established prior to the rule. First,
clearly the requirement had not been applied to underwriters or
broker buyers but only to the ultimate recipients of a distribution.55
Presumably this interpretation remains under Rule 147. Second,
the SEC has interpreted "residence" to mean something closer to
"domicile." This latter term was first introduced in a Senate report
on the 1954 amendment to 3(a) (11).56 A former SEC associate gen-
eral counsel observed that this second interpretation was a neces-
sary adjunct to the requirement of bona fide residence. 57 Of the
53. Release 1459.
54. Rule 147, Section (d) provides:
Offerees and Purchasers: Person Resident. Offers, offers to sell,
offers for sale and sales of securities that are part of an issue shall
be made only to persons resident within the state or territory of
which the issuer is a resident. For purposes of determining the
residence of offerees and purchasers:
(1) A corporation, partnership, trust or other form of business
organization shall be deemed to be a resident of a state or territory
if, at the time of the offer and sale to it, it has its principal office
within such state or territory.
(2) An individual shall be deemed to be a resident of a state
or territory if such individual has at the time of the offer and sale
to him, his principal residence in the state or territory.
(3) A corporation, partnership, trust or other form of business
organization which is organized for the specific purpose of acquir-
ing part of an issue offered pursuant to this rule shall be deemed
not to be a resident of a state or territory unless all of the benefi-
cial owners of such organization are residents of such state or terri-
tory.
55. Release 4434; Letter ruling, Acting Chief Counsel, Division of Cor-
poration Finance, [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
76,411 (S.E.C. September 28, 1956).
56. S. REP. No. 1036 at 13, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) stated: "Thus
the exemption provided by this section of the act has not been considered
available unless the entire issue of securities was offered and sold exclu-
sively to persons domiciled in one State."
57. McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions under the Federal Se-
curities Act, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 937, 945 (1959). Other commentators differ:
Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act of 1933
in 1971, 40 U. CINN. L. Rv. 779, 781 (1971).
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two, it is the more difficult to enforce, because residence requires
a dwelling place, while domicile requires only animus manendi-
the intent to establish a dwelling.58
Release 4434 cited the presence of military personnel in their
state of assignment as exemplary of ties with a state insufficient
to satisfy the residence requirement of the Act, but this example
does not adequately distinguish 3(a) (11) "residence" from the gar-
den variety. After all, many military personnel retain residence
in their state of origin for the purposes of tax and auto registration,
so in senses other than this one they are nonresidents of their state
of assignment. Furthermore, the intent implicit in the concept of
"domicile" was noticeably lacking in the Release 4434 discussion.
In brief, the partial synthesis of "residence" and "domicile" resulted
in highly unsatisfactory ambiguity. 9
The concept of "intent" created an additional problem in the
case of the purchaser who subsequently becomes a nonresident.
Observers expressed the view that such a move by a good faith
resident who relocated shortly after purchase would not destroy
the exemption. However, this result conflicted with the SEC
mandate that "securities at the time of completion of ultimate dis-
tribution shall be found only in the hands of investors resident
within the state."6 1 Such a requirement, when considered in light
of the Commission's position that obtaining formal representations
of residence provided no defense for the issuer,62 thrust the issuer
into the precarious position of insuring his offerees' animus ma-
nendi.
The rule as originally proposed retained the concept of intent
and coupled with it a new requirement, providing that the pur-
chaser "must have his principal residence in the state and must
not have any present intention of moving his principal residence
to another state. '63 Deletion of the second of these propositions
from the final draft 4 eliminates the question of the purchaser's
58. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES RE ULATIONS 599 (2d ed. 1961). For a compre-
hensive discussion of "domicile " and "residence," see Reese & Green, That
Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561, 580 (1953).
59. When asked how he would determine whether somebody is domi-
ciled in a particular state for purposes of Section 3 (a) (11), Carl W. Schnei-
der, a securities authority, responded, "I don't know." Schneider, The
Intrastate Offering Exemption, in SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 22, 27 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. ed. 1971).
60. Schaefer, An Anmtated Checklist for the Federal Intrastate Ex-
emption from Registration of Securities, 34 MONT. L. Rnv. 1, 9 (1973).
61. Securities Act Release No. 33-201, 11 F.R. § 10952 (1934).
62. Release 1459.
63. Release 5349.
64. Rule 147(d) (2).
intent and the problem of the purchaser who moves after the trans-
action. The insistence that the purchaser be deemed a resident
of the state of his principal residence demonstrates that the SEC
will recognize only one state of residence. Of course, a purchaser
may maintain several abodes; thus, it seems that the Commission
may have created a new ambiguity by its use of the term "prin-
cipal." Speculation suggests that, unburdened by "intent" consider-
ations, the Commission will adopt a standard based on the relative
aggregate amounts of time spent by the purchaser at each abode. 6
Presumably, promulgating another rule would not be necessary to
reach such a result.
One problem collateral to the residence of individuals is not
treated by the rule. Where residents acquire intrastate shares pur-
suant to an installment payment plan and move to another state
before completing payments, it appears that the transaction con-
stitutes a violation, since the sale is not treated as complete until
payment of the full purchase price.6 6 Rule 147 suggests no change
of policy on this point.
The new rule represents a substantial change in the character
of "residence," as it applies to business organization purchasers.
Previously, commentators agreed that a corporation to be a valid
resident purchaser should be incorporated in the state of the issuer's
residence. 67 With Rule 147 the SEC has adopted, as the test of
residence, the location of the corporation's principal office, because
"this is more of an indication of its local character for purposes
of the offeree residence provision than is its state of incorpora-
tion."68
In the case of a purchasing partnership, commentators were
not in agreement as to whether a residence requirement existed
for individual general partners.6 9 However, the 1971 SEC Pacific
Income Plan Company letter ruling,70 which disallowed an exemp-
tion because of the nonresidence of one of the purchaser's limited
65. See Phillips v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 195 S.C. 472, 12 S.E.
2d 13,18 (1940).
66. See United States v. Kormel, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D. Nev.
1964). But cf. In re Whitehall Corp., 3 S.E.C. 259, 269 (1956).
67. Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act
of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CINN. L. REV. 779, 787 (1971); 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATIONS 600 (2d ed. 1961); McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions
under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 949 (1959); Schae-
fer, An Annotated Checklist Jor the Federal Intrastate Exemption from Reg-
istration of Securities, 34 MONT. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
68. Release 5450.
69. McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions under the Federal Se-
curities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 949 (1959) required residence in this
situation. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 600 (2d ed. 1961), took the po-
sition that the residence of individual general partners was not required.
70. Letter ruling, Deputy Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Fi-
nance, regarding Pacific Income Plan Company of California (S.E.C., Au-
gust 6, 1971), noted in Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the
Securities Act of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 785 n.32 (1971).
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partners, was received as a breach from former policy.71 Under
Rule 147, both partnerships and business trusts are categorized to-
gether with corporations so that the location of their principal of-
fices determines residence. This interpretation, by making the resi-
dence of business organizations readily apparent, substantially eases
the burden on the issuer as insurer of his purchasers' residence.
The further requirement that individual beneficial owners be resi-
dents, where the purchasing organization has been created for the
specific purpose of acquiring the disputed securities, is consistent
with an earlier SEC letter to Controll Awnings, Inc.
7 2
Professor Loss argued that, in the case of a private trust, resi-
dence of the trustee should be determinative.7 3 Although this view
is not inconsistent with Rule 147, the new rule sheds no light on
the question.
IV. WHEN IS AN ISSUER RESIDENT AND Don G
BUSINESS WITHIN A STATE?
Under Section 3 (a) (11) the issuer as well as the purchaser must
be a resident of the state in which the distribution is executed.
Rule 147 provides in part:
(c) (1) The issuer shall be deemed to be a resident of the
state or territory in which:
(i) it is incorporated or organized, if a corporation, lim-
ited partnership, trust or other form of business
organization that is organized under state or terri-
torial law;
(ii) its principal office is located, if 'a general partnership
or other form of business organization that is not
organized under any state or territorial law;
(iii) his principal residence is located, if an individual.
7 4
As with purchasers, the question of the residence of issuers has
been slightly litigated. As late as 1961, Professor Loss could write,
"[W]hatever 'resident' means, it presumably has the same mean-
ing as applied to both buyer and issuer."7 5 Indeed, the "principal
residence" rule adopted for individual issuers under Rule 14776 is
the same as that for individual purchasers. However, the distinc-
71. Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act
of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 785 (1971).
72. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporation Finance, [1973 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,333 (S.E.C., April 4, 1973).
73. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 599 (2d ed. 1961).
74. Rule 147(c).
75. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 599 (2d ed. 1961).
76. Release 5450. Here, SEC contemplates promoters issuing pre-
incorporation certificates.
tions between the Section (d) residence requirements for business
organization purchasers and the residence requirements for busi-
ness organization issuers under the instant provision bear examina-
tion.
Unlike Section (d), Section (c) distinguishes between busi-
nesses requiring state charters and those not so organized according
to state laws. The latter fall within the "principal office" rule, as
do business organizations generally under Section (d). This result
is consistent with the Louisiana Motor Inns letter ruling,7 7 in which
the SEC permitted the exemption where a general partner to the
issuer was incorporated in a state different from the offering state.
The rule as initially proposed provided that all general partners
of an issuing partnership be residents of the state of the offering,
but the SEC modified the provision to conform to its treatment
of corporate offerors. 8
Section 3(a) (11) provides that issuing corporations, to qualify
for exemption, must be organized under the laws of the state of
the offering. Here, Rule 147 merely conforms to the explicit man-
date of the Act, but the SEC has further extended the requirement
to other business organizations which require state charters. This
position neglects an additional requirement suggested in a recent
letter ruling to Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., that the residence
of corporation directors might be determinative.79 In that case
prior sales had been made to nonresidents, unequivocally destroy-
ing the exemption. However, the Commission, in framing its den-
ial, drew attention to the fact that three out of five of the corpo-
ration's directors were not residents of the state of issue. This
suggestion was apparently dicta which has enjoyed no parallel ex-
pression and is properly laid to rest by Rule 147.
Rule 147 institutes a fair standard for resolving residence ques-
tions among business organization issuers by basing residence deter-
minations in all cases on the character of the business entity rather
than on that of its beneficial owners.
Rule 147's "doing business within" standard 0 is effectively an
77. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporate Finance, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,902 (S.E.C., April 4, 1972).
78. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
79. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporation Finance, [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,603 (S.E.C., January 5, 1972).
80. Rule 147(c) (2) provides:
The issuer shall be deemed to be doing business within a state or
territory if:
(i) the issuer derived at least 80% of its gross revenues and
those of its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis
(A) for its most recent fiscal year, if the first offer of any part
of the issue is made during the first six months of the issuer's cur-
rent fiscal year; or
(B) for the first six months of its current fiscal year or during
the twelve month fiscal period ending with such six month period,
if the first offer of any part of the issue is made during the last
six months of the issuer's current fiscal year from the operation of
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extension of the "residence" concept with respect to business enter-
prises, as illustrated by the requirement that the issuer's principal
office be located in its state of incorporation. In addition, in order
to be deemed to be doing business within a state under the rule,
an issuer must fulfill three more criteria: he must intend to use,
and use, eighty per cent of the net proceeds of the issue within
the state; eighty per cent of his assets, including those of sub-
sidiaries, must be located within the state as of the end of the most
recent semi-annual fiscal period; and he must have derived eighty
per cent of his gross revenues, including those of subsidiaries, from
activities within the state.8 ' Such activity is limited to the render-
ing of services or the operation of a business within the state and the
management of real property located in the state. The proportion
of revenues will be measured for the most recent fiscal year or
alternatively, where the issue is initiated during the last six months
of the issuer's fiscal year, for the first six months of that year.
The "doing business" requirement first received attention in Se-
curities and Exchange Commission v. Truckee Showboat, Inc.8 2
There, a California corporation, whose assets consisted solely of a
San Francisco pharmaceutical business worth $12,629.59, had made
a $4,080,000.00 offering exclusively to California residents. The en-
tire net proceeds of the issue were to be used in the acquisition
and operation of a Las Vegas hotel. Without setting forth its rea-
soning, the court found as a matter of law that Section 3(a) (11)
was not available to the defendant.83 The SEC in Release 4434 at-
tempted to interpret the Truckee holding to bar unrelated business
activity outside the issuer's residence state:
If the proceeds of the offering are to be used primarily for
a business or of real property located in or from the rendering of
services within such state or territory; provided, however, that this
provision does not apply to any issuer which has not had gross rev-
enues in excess of $5,000 from the sale of products or services or
other conduct of its business for its most recent twelve month fiscal
period;
(ii) the issuer had at the end of its most recent semi-annual
fiscal period prior to the first offer of any part of the issue, at least
80 per cent of its assets and those of its subsidiaries on a consoli-
dated basis located within such state or territory;
(iii) the issuer intends to use and uses at least 80% of the net
proceeds to the issuer from sales made pursuant to this rule in con-
nection with the operation of a business or of real property, the
purchase of real property located in, or the rendering of services
within such state or territory; and
(iv) the principal office of the issuer is located within such
state or territory.
81. This third requirement applies only for an issuer whose gross rev-
enues exceed $5,000.00 for the most recent fiscal year. Rule 147 (c).
82. 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
83. Id. at 825.
the purpose of a new business conducted outside of the
State of incorporation and unrelated to some incidental
business locally conducted, the exemption should not be re-
lied upon.84
No analogous cases have arisen in the interim to test this re-
striction against establishing a new business out of state. Truckee
was cited in support of two other denials of the exemption, but
neither involved an issuer operating a different form of enterprise
outside the state.85 Rule 147 does not place this sort of limitation
on the character of the issuer's out-of-state activity. Nevertheless
Truckee remains important for its contention, however vaguely ar-
ticulated, that the issuer under Section 3 (a) (11) must be essentially
local in character.
Since Truckee, both the SEC and the courts have relied heavily
on some less than emphatic hints to the same effect by the legisla-
tors responsible for 3 (a) (11)86 to conclude that,
The legislative history of the Securities Act clearly shows
that this exemption was designed to apply only to local
financing that may practicably be consummated in its en-
tirety within the State or Territory in which the issuer is
both incorporated and doing business.
87
On the strength of this presumed local character -the SEC, in the
same release, proceeded to set forth and substantiate several other
varieties of violations.
First, the Commission admonished that a truly local business
must not be structurally related to non-resident corporations:
[A] section 3 (a) (11) exemption should not be relied upon
for each of a series of corporations organized in different
States where there is in fact and purpose a single business
enterprise or financial venture whether or not it is planned
to merge or consolidate the various corporations at a later
date.8
In this regard it cited In re Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage
Exchange,8 9 in which one member of such a multistate operation
was enjoined from issuing securities pursuant to the exemption.
However, that injunction was based on the integration of the de-
fendant's distribution of securities with distributions out of state
by related non-resident corporations, with the result that shares
deemed to be part of the same issue were found to have been sold
out of state. The court made no mention of the "doing business"
requirement.90 To complicate matters, Securities and Exchange
84. Release 4434.
85. Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 158 (6th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Mc-
Donald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D. Minn. 1972).
86. See note 17 supra.
87. Release 4434.
88. Id.
89. 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
90. Id. at 871.
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Commission v. McDonald Investment Co.91 cited Los Angeles in
questionable support of yet a different "doing business" proposition;
to wit, that an issuer who employs the bulk of his proceeds from
the sale of securities in securing mortgages on out-of-state land will
not receive the benefit of the exemption.2
Still, the SEC's requirement that the exempted issuer be a sep-
arate business not interrelated with nonresident affiliates, whether
or not supported by Los Angeles, survives. This proposition, al-
though not a mainstay of Rule 147, finds expression in the require-
ment that an accounting of the proportion of the issuer's assets lo-
cated within the state, his revenues earned within the state, and
the amount of his proceeds to be invested within the state must
be computed on a consolidated basis to include the activities of any
subsidiary; perhaps, its influence is also felt in the requirement that
eighty per cent of the proceeds of the issue be put to use within
the state.
93
The SEC in Release 4434 issued one further, all-encompassing
requirement for "doing business within" a state: "[TIhe require-
ment ... can only be satisfied by the performance of substantial
operational activities, in the state of incorporation. '94 The release
clearly explained that bookkeeping activities would not be consid-
ered "substantial." It cited as illustrations of violative activities:
first, the sale by a domestic corporation of fractional interests in
oil and gas producing properties located outside the state, "even
though the company conducted other business in the State of in-
corporation"; 95 and second, the sale by a domestic corporation of
interests in out-of-state mortgages in such a way as to constitute
a sale of securities.
Beyond addressing the presumed local character of Section 3 (a)
(11), the SEC supplied no reasoning to support such a narrowing
of the exemption. This was left to two courts which faced these
illustrations incarnate. Chapman v. Dunn96 presented the case of
a Michigan issuer, a lifetime resident who maintained his office in
that state, who distributed pursuant to 3(a) (11) oil and gas leases
located in Ohio. The court, after reviewing in detail the legislative
history evidencing the exemption's local character and the overrid-
ing purpose of the Act to protect investors,9 7 emphasized the time-
91. SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343- (D. Minn. 1972).
92. Id. at 346.
93. See note 80 supra.
94. Release 4434.
95. Id.
96. 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
97. Id. at 156-57.
consuming jurisdictional complexities which the Michigan Securi-
ties Commission would face in any effort to prevent the issuer from
dealing with the leased properties. In denying the exemption, it
concluded:
[T]he issuer must conduct a predominant amount of his
business within this same State. This business which the
issuer must conduct within the same State refers to the
income producing operations of the business in which the
issuer is selling the securities ....98
Although the Chapman dissent convincingly argued that the
Michigan commission had sufficient jurisdiction to come to the aid
of stockholders, 9 the court in Securities and Exchange Commission
v. McDonald adopted the position of the Chapman majority that
a predominant amount of income producing property must be lo-
cated within the state of issue.100 McDonald, a Minnesota corpora-
tion, bought mortgages on out-of-state development tracts which
it financed through the intrastate sale of unsecured debt obliga-
tions. The court encountered difficulty in paralleling the reasoning
of the Chapman court that shareholders' interests were not pro-
tected by adequate jurisdiction; their interests, it found, enjoyed
priority claims to McDonald's assets, including the secured loans.
Nevertheless, it based its denial of the exemption on the premise
that:
[T] he strength of the installment notes depends perhaps
not legally, but practically, to a large degree on the success
or failure of land developments located outside Minnesota,
such land not being subject to the jurisdiction of the Min-.
nesota court.10 '
Once again, the jurisdictional argument appears hollow, because it
was based not so much on the integrity of the disputed securities,
as it properly should have been, but rather on the success or failure
of the business enterprise.
Nonetheless, the Rule 147 "doing business" requirement is based
largely on the proposition that the predominant amount of income
producing property be located within the issuer's state of residence,
as held in Shaw v. United States.1 02 The requirements that eighty
per cent of the issuer's revenues be derived from the residence state,
that the same percentage of his assets be located therein, and that
he put the same percentage of his proceeds to use within the state,
provide an objective touchstone for a court faced with the factual
determination of a "predominant amount of activity" as required by
Shaw.
Incidentally, the requirement that the issuer must derive eighty
98. Id. at 159.
99. Id. at 162.
100. SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D. Minn. 1972).
101. Id.
102. 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942).
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per cent of his revenues from operations within the state does not
apply to an issuer whose gross revenues do not exceed $5,000.00
for the most recent twelve month fiscal period. The SEC in Release
4434 specified its preference for small issues as follows: "An offer-
ing may be so large that its success as a local offering appears
doubtful from the outset. ' ' 1 Perhaps the new provision represents
an extension of this reasoning to favor small issuers as well as small
issues. In any event, such a small issuer whose principal office and
eighty per cent of whose assets are located in his state of residence,
and who plans to spend eighty per cent of the net proceeds of his
offering within the state, will be deemed to be "doing business"
therein.
In view of the SEC's strict limitations on the out-of-state prop-
erty interests of an issuer, a question arises as to the permissible
scope of activity in which an issuer based within the state may en-
gage and still be considered to operate a business or render services
"within a state or territory." The Power Hybrids, Inc. letter l 4
which followed Chapman suggested the conclusion that, where a
manufacturer's plant is located in the state of incorporation, his
sale of products outside the state will not defeat the exemption. 0 5
In Release 5450 adopting Rule 147, the SEC provides an illustration
expanding this conclusion. Where the issuer, who operates a mail
order house in the state of incorporation both purchases and sells
its stock in trade out of state, the standard is satisfied.106 Appar-
ently only out-of-state property interests, rather than out-of-state
transactions are forbidden.
Release 5450 provides in addition an example of the controlling
standard for performing services within a state. 0 T In this hypo-
thetical situation, the issuer is an engineering consulting firm with
its only office in its state of incorporation. Only fifty per cent of its
revenue is derived from local clients and its personnel spend only
seventy-five per cent of their man hours in the state. It is difficult
to see how such a firm can be said to perform eighty per cent of its
103. Release 4434.
104. Letter ruling, Assistant Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Fi-
nance (S.E.C., July 8, 1971).
105. Id. See also Letter ruling, Assistant Chief Counsel, Division of
Corporation Finance regarding Kebco, Inc. (S.E.C., June 17, 1971); Letter
ruling, Attorney Advisor, Division of Corporation Finance regarding Puget
Sound Plywood, Inc. (S.E.C., May 4, 1971), both noted in Emens & Thomas,
The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. Cmn.
L. REV. 779, 790 n.53 (1971).
106. Release 5450 § 5, Example 2.
107. Id. at Example 4.
services within the state of incorporation, but the SEC contends
that the "doing business within" standard is satisfied. 08
This result is consistent with the interpretation that the SEC's
chief prohibition is against the holding of substantial out-of-state
property interests by the issuer. Such an interpretation is also con-
sistent with one further SEC illustration:10 9 an issuer, more than
twenty per cent of whose assets are represented by accounts receiv-
able from clients in other states, will be held to satisfy the "assets"
standard because, "[f]or purposes of the rule, accounts receivable
arising from a business conducted in the state would generally be
considered to be located at the principal office of the issuer."11 0
Generally, the "doing business" standard as prescribed in Rule
147, provides objective criteria to substitute for the prior subjective
requirement that the issuer under Section 3 (a) (11) conduct the pre-
dominant amount of his income-producing operations in the state of
incorporation. Although the rule purports to limit business con-
ducted and services rendered in another state as well as out-of-
state property holdings, the SEC, through its examples discussed
hereinbefore, has confirmed that neither out-of-state purchases and
sales alone nor the rendering of services to nonresidents will de-
stroy the exemption, where the center of business activity is in the
state of incorporation.
V. THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION
The sale to a nonresident of any security which is part of an
issue offered pursuant to the intrastate exemption destroys the ex-
emption for the entire issue. Thus, the question of what securities
sold to nonresidents will be "integrated," or treated as parts of the
same issue with securities distributed pursuant to the intrastate ex-
emption, becomes vital to the application of Section 3 (a) (11).
Rule 147 provides that the SEC will not integrate with any
disputed issue offers or sales of registered securities or securities
distributed pursuant to the Section 3 or Section 4(2) exemptions"'
which take place at least six months prior to any offer or sale of
the disputed issue or six months after any such offer or sale.
Where offers or sales of securities sought to be segregated by the
distributor into separate issues are not separated by the prescribed
six-month period, and these securities are of the same or a similar
class, integration will be automatic.11 2 Where such securities are
108. Id.
109. Id. at Example 5.
110. Id. This is consistent with the rule for determining the state of
jurisdiction for accounts receivable in secured transactions. UNIFOmVZ COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-103(1).
111. This covers effectively all securities which, considered alone, are
legitimately exempt from registration under the Act.
112. Rule 147(b) provides:
Part of an Issue.
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not of a similar class, prior SEC interpretations of integration will
be determinative.' 13
The use of "issue" in Section 3(a) (11) to designate some un-
defined subclass of securities represents an unfortunate Congres-
sional choice of words, which caused considerable confusion before
the adoption of Rule 147. A former SEC general counsel observed
that the term, "used as a noun, may be regarded as a species of
financial slang, which in general significance is familiar to everyone,
but in precise content must be conceded to take on the color of
its surroundings.""14  Concededly, when all activities related to
both issues were limited to a single state, the exemption was not
threatened" 5-likewise, where disputed transfers were by loan or
gift."0 However, such unlikely circumstances provided issuers vir-
tually their only sure sanctuary.
The holding of In re Unity Gold Corporation"1 7 provided mean-
ingful albeit flexible, guidelines for the issuer: "[For different
blocks of securities,] material differences in the use of the proceeds
[and] in the manner and terms of distribution,""18 would be disposi-
tive on the question of integration. However, the court in Shaw
(1) For purposes of this rule, all securities of the issuer which
are part of an issue shall be offered, offered for sale or sold in ac-
cordance with all of the terms and conditions of this rule.
(2) For purposes of this rule only, an issue shall be deemed
not to include offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securi-
ties of the issuer pursuant to the exemptions provided by Section
3 or Section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement
filed under the Act, that takes place prior to the six month period
immediately preceding or after the six month period immediately
following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant to this rule,
provided that, there are during either of said six month periods no
offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of
the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold
pursuant to the rule.
NOTE: In the event that securities of the same or similar class
as those offered pursuant to the rule are offered, offered for
sale or sold less than six months prior to or subsequent to
any offer, offer for sale or sale, pursuant to this rule, see Pre-
liminary Note 3 hereof [listing the five integration factors
discussed heretofore], as to which offers, offers to sell, offers
for sale, or sales are part of an issue.
113. Release 5450 § 3.
114. Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PaOB. 89, 110 (1937).
115. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporation Finance, regarding
Space Corporation, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,096 (March 25, 1971).
116. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 90 n.2 (D.N.H.
1958), permanent injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Hillsborough v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
117. 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938). Fact summary, see note 148 and accompany-
ing text infra.
118. Id. at 625.
v. United States,119 in what was perhaps an overly zealous response
to the defendant's contention that "issue" should be interpreted
narrowly so as to segregate all separate sales of securities, broad-
ened the term beyond utility: "The 'issue' of 3 (a) (11) includes
all the shares of common character originally though successively
issued by the corporation.
1 20
Release 4434 represented the Commission's first comprehensive
effort to elucidate the "integration" problem. Therein the SEC
characterized the problem of whether an offering was "part of an
issue" as a question of fact, in the determination of which, any one
or more of five factors might be dispositive:
(1) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing;
(2) do the offerings involve issuance of the same class of
security;
(3) are the offerings made at or about the same time;
(4) is the same type of consideration to be received; and
(5) are the offerings made for the same general pur-
pose.
1 21
The cases herinafter discussed demonstrate that the SEC's alterna-
tive application of these disjunctive and overlapping considerations
resulted in an unpredictable pattern of enforcement.
Taken by itself, the first consideration appears to equate with
an introductory generality in the release: "[Integration] depends
essentially upon whether the offerings are a related part of a plan
or program."'122 The Commission presented this observation in a
context supportive of another narrower canon born of contempor-
ary SEC litigation, as follows: "[T]he exemption should not be
relied upon in combination with another exemption for the differ-
ent parts of a single issue where a part is offered or sold to non-
residents."' 23 In both cases, Unity Gold and In re Peoples Secur-
ities Company, 24 cited by the Commission in relation to this nar-
rower contention, none other of the enumerated considerations pre-
sented difficulty: time lapse between the offerings was inconse-
quential, and the type of consideration received, the class of stock
issued, and the general purpose of the offering were closely com-
parable. Nonetheless, it has been observed that this first considera-
tion-whether offerings constitute part of a single plan of financ-
119. 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942).




If an issuer, acting in good faith, were unsuccessful in selling its
entire issue to residents and were to offer the rest after registering,
the Commission would be unlikely to take any action except to re-
quire the registration statement to disclose a contingent liability
under Section 12(1) for selling in violation of § 5-though there
would seem to be no defense to such liability.
1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 593 (2d ed. 1961).
124. 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960).
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ing-is, if interpreted literally, broad enough to encompass the
other four. One writer suggests it is really the only factor.125 For
example, it was applied to In re American Marietta"1" to integrate
stock distributions to shareholders of several companies acquired
by the issuer, where the acquisitions were found to constitute a
continuing plan of distribution. Moreover, this first consideration
is sufficiently vague to knock out distributions which may pass
muster under two or three of the more specific considerations. Per-
haps this is why the other four considerations have proven so il-
lusory.
Concerning the second consideration, the SEC early in its his-
tory voiced firm assurance to issuers who wished to segregate offer-
ings of separate classes of securities; an early release stated:
Whatever may be the precise limits of the concept of
"issue" when all securities involved are of the same class,
I do not believe that securities of different classes can fairly
be deemed parts of a single "issue".** *
In expressing this opinion, I do not mean to imply that
any difference in the. incidents of two blocks of securities,
however trivial, renders the blocks separate classes and
hence separate "issues" for the purposes of the Act. 12T
Especially in view of a later release, in which the Commission sug-
gested that integration might be based only on a conjunctive rather
than a disjunctive satisfaction of the five key factors, 129 the SEC
seemed to have given its blessing to an intrastate offering of se-
curities which displayed a legitimate class distinction from another
offering distributed interstate.
The cases do not support such view. In re Peoples Securities
Company,129 not surprisingly, integrated options for the purchase
of common stock sold interstate with an intrastate offering of com-
mon stock.130 However, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
125. Sosin, The Intrastate Exemption: Public Offerings and the Issue
Concept, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 110, 124 (1964).
126. See SEC PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS IN UNDERWRIT-
IN 183-84, 200-01, 207-10 (C. Israels ed. PLI 1962), noted in Schneider, The
Intrastate Offering Exemption, in SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 11 n.8 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. ed. 1971).
127. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-2029, 11 F.R. § 10963 (1939).
128. Compare SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 F.R. § 11316
(1962), which stated, "The following five factors are relevant to such ques-
tion of integration .. " with Release 4434: "Any one or more of the fol-
lowing five factors may be determinative of the question of integra-
tion. .. ."
129. 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960).
130. In re Peoples Securities Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960).
Hillsborough Investment Corp."' extended this reasoning to inte-
grate debt and equity securities in order to prevent blatant circum-
vention of the Act. Although the facts as presented in the opinion
are incomplete, it appears that Hillsborough, which had previously
been enjoined from continuing an interstate distribution of common
equity securities, attempted to repurchase these securities, and to
substitute in their stead a distribution consisting of a combination
of debt securities and common and preferred equity securities.
Hillsborough planned to limit this latter distribution to intrastate
sales, and so avoid the registration requirement. Understandably,
Hillsborough was enjoined from this latter effort also.132 However,
without such extenuating circumstances, a recent SEC letter ruling
to Property Investments, Inc.133 refused to segregate two blocks of
securities, one consisting entirely of intrastate debt securities and
the other entirely of registered common stock. In defense of the
decision, the Commission mentioned "[t] he proximity in time of the
two proposed offerings, the similar consideration to be received, and
the similar use of the proceeds .... ,134 It was noted that no proj-
ects were contemplated out of state. In conclusion the Commission
applied the first all-encompassing consideration: "IT]he similar use
of proceeds cause [s] the two proposed offerings to be in substance
one integrated scheme of financing."' 135 Of itself, then, the fact that
two distributions involve separate classes of securities has pro-
vided no guarantee against integration.
Neither was the length of the time lapse requisite to segregate
offerings a certainty. The landmark integration cases concerned
simultaneous or closely contiguous offerings. 36 However, the "is-
sue" definition from Shaw-"all the shares of common character
originally though successively issued"' 37-seemed to suggest that,
where the distributions constitute a single plan of financing, even
offerings remote in time might be integrated. In re Texas Glass
Manufacturing Corp.5 8 illustrated this possibility by integrating
distributions over a five-year period where other factors weighed
heavily for integration. Securities and Exchange Commission v.
131. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H.), per-
manent injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Hillsbor-
ough v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
132. Id. at 89.
133. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporation Finance, [1972-1973




136. Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960); In re
Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.),
aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); In re
Peoples Securities Co., 39 S.E.C. 641 (1960); In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C.
618 (1938).
137. Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1942).
138. 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
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Dunfee l1 represented a change in SEC policy; there the Commis-
sion refrained from integrating similar debt securities issued for
the same general purpose where the offerings were separated by
eight months. In a recent letter ruling on Property Investments,
Inc.,140 the SEC denied the exemption where the issuer contem-
plated that his offerings would be separated by at least six months.
In view of this decision the Rule 147 six-month limit on integration
is seen to represent perhaps a slightly more permissive interpreta-
tion of the time lapse consideration on the part of the Commission.
The principle that the SEC would avoid integrating distribu-
tions of securities, where the consideration paid therefore differed
substantially between the distributions, remained abstract for some
time. Recently several cases suggest its application. As might be
expected, a bare difference between amounts of consideration paid
is an insufficient distinction to avoid integration. 141 In Smith v.
Jackson Tool & Die, Inc.,1 42 the court considered several contributing
factors in deciding against integration of a prior private interstate
placement with an intrastate public offering of like securities. Con-
sideration for the out-of-state sale was the discharge of an antece-
dent corporate debt of the issuer, whereas intrastate sales were for
cash. Furthermore, unlike recipients of the public distribution, the
private out-of-state purchaser paid no broker's fee or commission.
The court, however, mentioned neither the "type of consideration"
criterion nor, specifically, any of the other four integration factors.
Furthermore, the implication that the case was decided on the ba-
sis of the difference between the types of consideration was weak-
ened by the court's substantial reliance on the variation in the is-
suer's business procedures in executing the several distributions.
The public offering was presented to a stockholders' meeting,
whereas the interstate placement was not.143 Perhaps a more di-
rect application of this fourth consideration is seen in the United
Capital Life Insurance Co. letter ruling,14 4 which permitted the ex-
139. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,970 (W.D.
Mo. 1967).
140. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporation Finance, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,201 (S.E.C. November 17,
1972).
141. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H.), perma-
nent injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Hillsborough
Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (lst Cir. 1960); In re Texas Glass Mfg. Corp.,
38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
142. 419 F.2d 152 (Sth Cir. 1969).
143. Id. at 153.
144. Letter ruling, Staff, Division of Corporation Finance (S.E.C., June
9, 1971).
emption in the case of a prior private placement to a nonresident
made to secure new management.
The fifth consideration in integration-whether the offerings
are made for the same general purpose--concerns use of proceeds
from the offering. Illustrative of this type of integration is Texas
Glass,145 where the SEC integrated distributions made over a five-
year period all for the purpose of acquiring initial financing.
146
Conversely, Jackson and the United Capital Life letter provide ex-
amples in which use of the proceeds of the contested offerings might
be considered sufficiently diverse to avoid integration.
Rule 147(b), as originally proposed in Release 5349, provided
a comprehensive inclusive standard for integration, applicable to
all securities of or sold by the "issuer, its predecessors or affiliates
within any consecutive six-month period,"' 47 and excluding all
others. The adoption of such a position, of course, would have in-
volved an effective reversal of Jackson and the United Capital let-
ter which decided against integration on the basis of the character
of each respective distribution, even absent a substantial time
lapse between contested offerings. The less-restrictive revision is
exclusive only; sales separated by more than six months, as in the
proposed provision, will not be integrated. Integration of sales
within a six-month period will be determined on a case-to-case ba-
sis, using the five considerations examined above. Several results
are apparent: the classic type of integration case, represented by
United Gold and Peoples Securities,148 in which the issuer distrib-
utes nearly simultaneous private interstate and public intrastate
offerings, will be treated as before; issuers of identical offerings
for an identical purpose, but separated by more than six months,
as in Texas Glass, will receive the benefit of the exclusionary pro-
vision; legitimate differences in the character of the securities or
the transactions by which they are simultaneously distributed
should serve to prevent integration, as it did in Jackson and the
United letter. No doubt, however, where sales are within six
months, integration will be difficult to avoid.
Another narrow problem merits discussion. A 1961 SEC letter
to Lexton-Ancira, Inc.,1 49 integrated an intrastate distribution of
common stock by that issuer with a closely proximate sale of lim-
ited partnership interests of a limited partnership of which Lexton-
Ancira was to be a general partner. Apparently, the controlling
factor in the decision was Lexton's plan to use the proceeds from
145. In re Texas Glass Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
146. See also In re Universal Service Corp., 37 S.E.C. 559, 560, 561, 564
(1957).
147. Release 5349.
148. See also In re Edsco Mfg. Co., 40 S.E.C. 865 (1961).
149. Letter ruling, Assistant Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Fi-
nance, regarding Lexton-Ancira, Inc. (S.E.C., July 23, 1971), noted in Emens
& Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 in 1971,
40 U. CiN. L. REv. 779, 794 (1971).
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the intrastate offering to finance the interstate offering. One com-
mentator characterized this development as "the concept of inte-
grating issuers rather than securities,"150 Under the proposed rule,
sales within six months by affiliates were automatically integrated.
Under the revised rule they are not, and the five considerations
previously enumerated are determinative. Presumably, because of
the similarity in general purpose between the two offerings in Lex-
ton-Ancira, they would still be integrated under Rule 147. How-
ever, as a general rule for issuers bearing the same relationship
as the parties in Lexton-Ancira, where the general purposes of their
respective offerings are more disparate they should not be inte-
grated; logically the mere presence of one or more of the other
four factors, such as similarity in the type of security or proximity
of the issue date, should not, in the absence of a related general
purpose, suffice to integrate the distributions of separate issuers.
VI. RESALES TO NONRESIDENTS
If a security which is part of an issue distributed pursuant to
the intrastate exemption is offered or sold to a nonresident, the
exemption fails for the entire issue. The In re Brooklyn Manhattan
Transit Corporation'" referee noted of Section 3 (a) (11):
The provision does not define the point at which sales to
residents are to be taken into account. Such sales signifi-
cantly are not related to the issuer, although in every one
of the other ten categories of exempted securities, .. the
exemptions are specifically related to the issuer. 52
Release 201 defined that point before which offers or sales to
nonresidents by any party would defeat the exemption:
[I]n order that the exemption of Section 3 (a) (11) may be
available for securities of any issue, it is clearly required
that the securities at the time of completion of ultimate
distribution shall be found in the hands of investors resi-
dent within the state. 53
Thus, reoffers and resales by an initial resident purchaser to
a nonresident before completion of the distribution would defeat
the exemption as surely as would such sales by the issuer. The
SEC in Release 97 (k) observed that such an interpretation was nec-
essary to enforce the substance as well as the form of the exemp-
150. Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act
of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. CiN. L. REv. 779, 794-95 (1971).
151. 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
152. Id. at 162.
153. Release 201.
tion.154 Nevertheless, the Commission provided repeated assur-
ances that eventual resales were quite permissible.155 This much
was clear; the question whether or not the issue had, in SEC par-
lance, "come to rest" so as to admit of resales to nonresidents was
treated as a question of fact in each case. 56 More importantly,
however, the elements of the determinative legal definition of
"coming to rest" were somewhat less clear.
Rule 147(e) 117 provides that a security which is part of an issue
distributed under the intrastate exemption shall not be sold by the
purchaser to a nonresident until nine months from the date of the
last sale by the issuer of such securities. For convertible securities,
the nine-month period begins at the last sale of the convertible se-
curities by the issuer, and conversion by the purchaser does not
start a new waiting period.'5 8
Before the adoption of Rule 147, three considerations contrib-
uted to the concept of "coming to rest." The first was the effect
of the good faith of an issuer who sells to purchasers who thereaf-
ter resell to nonresidents. It has been demonstrated that in the
application of Section 3(a) (11) generally, the good faith of the is-
suer provides no defense. 59 However, in Brooklyn Manhattan
Transit, in which the issuer sold to professional underwriters who
immediately executed resales to nonresidents, the Commission em-
phasized that the issuer had knowingly sold to underwriters, in
whose hands the securities remained an unsold allotment and that
154. 17 C.F.R. 231.97 (k) (1973).
155. Id.; Release 1459; Release 4434.
156. In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 163 (1935);
Release 4434; Letter ruling, Deputy Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation
Finance, regarding First Midwest Investment Corp. (S.E.C., August 14,
1971).
157. Rule 147(e) provides:
Limitation of Resales. During the period in which securities that
are part of an issue are being offered and sold by the issuer, and
for a period of nine months from the date of the last sale by the
issuer of such securities, all resales of any part of the issue, by any
person, shall be made only to persons resident within such state or
territory.
NOTES: 1. In the case of convertible securities resales of ei-
ther the convertible security, or if it is converted, the under-
lying security, could be made during the period described in
paragraph (e) only to persons resident within such state or
territory. For purposes of this rule a conversion in reliance
on Section 3(a) (9) of the Act does not begin a new period.
2. Dealers must satisfy the requirements of Rule
15c2-11 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prior to
publishing any quotation for a security, or submitting any
quotation for publication, in any quotation medium.
158. A note warns dealers that although such resales must necessarily
be remote in time from sales by the issuer, dealers are not relieved of their
prohibition against selling more than forty days after notification to the
SEC by an issuer utilizing a Regulation A exemption. This prohibition ap-
pears in Rule 15c2-11, Securities Act Release No. 34-9310 (December 13,
1971). Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. 230.254 (1973), exempts certain small offer-
ings from the operation of the Act.
159. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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the issuer knew its purchasers were not investors, but merely a
cog in the process of initial distribution.160 Such reasoning seemed
to prompt the observation that, in the case of resales at least, the
good faith of the issuer might be a controlling factor. However,
Release 4434 clarified the SEC position:
Any offers or sales to a nonresident . would destroy the
exemption as to all securities . . . regardless of whether
such sales are made directly to nonresidents or indirectly
through residents who as part of the distribution thereafter
sell to nonresidents.'
61
Thus, clearly the good faith of the issuer was not at issue; in ac-
cordance with this result, Rule 147 gives the question no treatment.
For the most part then, two remaining considerations-intent
of the initial purchaser and time lapse between completion of the
distribution and the disputed resale-contended for dominance in
determining when an issue had "come to rest." Release 97 required
only that the purchaser intend to hold the security for investment
rather than to engage immediately in trading. The release pro-
vided: "Sales cannot be made by the corporation to residents with
a view to their distribution in other jurisdictions."'162 This state-
ment supports the literal interpretation that a sale by a purchaser
with such a view, no matter how remote in time, would defeat the
exemption.
Release 201, issued at the crest of the Brooklyn Manhattan of-
fering, first introduced time lapse jargon, here synthesized with the
intent requirement: "[I] t is clearly required that the securities at
the time of the completion of ultimate distribution shall be found
only in the hands of investors resident within the state."1 68 The
requirement of the purchaser with "investor intent," as opposed to
the underwriter who purchases with an intent to resell, still appears
primary. On the fulfillment of a condition that all purchasers of
the distribution exhibit such "investor intent," then, after the
issuer's last sale, the issue should be deemed to have "come to rest."
Later releases are in accord.
164
In Brooklyn Manhattan the Commission by way of dicta estab-
lished a policy limiting the force of investment intent:
[T] he Securities Act incorporates in Section 4(1) a pre-
160. In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 152 (1935).
161. Release 4434. See also SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RE-
PORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 91, pt. 1, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 572,, In re Capital Funds, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 245, 246 (1964), aff'd
sub nom. Capital Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582, 586 (8th Cir. 1965).
162. Release 97.
163. Release 201 (emphasis supplied).
164. Release 4434; Release 1459.
sumption that sales by dealers within a period of one year
from the first date upon which the security was bona fide
offered to the public by the issuer or by or through an
underwriter are part of the distribution of the issue. That
presumption which Congress adopted should be applied
here, [to the problem of investment intent] not, however,
as a conclusive presumption of law but as a presumption
of fact subject to refutation upon a showing that distribu-
tion was completed within less than one year.165
Thus, intent of purchasers at the time of the transaction no
longer posed a threat infinitely into the future. If no resale were
made within one year, initial purchasers would be deemed to have
purchased with investment intent. If the resale were made before
one year had elapsed, the doctrine of Release 97 would be invoked
and the intent of the initial purchasers would have to be examined
to determine whether the issue had come to rest. Myer v. E.M.
Adams & Co.' 66 further demonstrated that the factual presumption
of investment intent in resales more than one year from issue would
be extremely difficult of rebuttal. The court there held: "As a
practical matter, purchasers of an intrastate offering are free to
resell their securities at the end of one year from the first date
of the offering."' 167
Resales within one year presented a different situation. The
holding in Hillsborough illustrates the typical situation. There,
where the issuer sold to purchasers who resold to nonresidents
simultaneously with the issuer's initial distribution, the court held:
Prior to the completion of ultimate distribution to secur-
ities holders, any resale of securities by residents to non-
residents, under an arrangement where the resident had
no intention of holding for investment, but buys as a straw
on behalf of a nonresident in the near future, is a devious
and futile attempt to acquire the benefits of section
3(a) (11).168
However, the court in In re Capital Funds, Inc.'6 9 injected a
new element of doubt into the significance of "investment intent."
A purchaser, having resold out of state before the termination of
the distribution and within one year of its commencement, pleaded
good faith investment intent. Release 201 and subsequent releases
had suggested that "coming to rest" entailed investment intent of
the purchasers plus termination of the distribution. Nevertheless,
although it eventually reached a finding of bad faith, the court en-
165. In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 162-63
(1935).
166. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,097 (Ore.
1973).
167. Id.
168. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 89 (D.N.H.), per-
manent injunction, 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1958), af 'd sub nom. Hills-
borough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
169. In re Capital Funds, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 245 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Capi-
tal Funds, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965).
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tertained the good faith argument at length,17 0 suggesting the pos-
sibility that a good faith purchaser could resell out of state before
completion of the distribution and within one year of its commence-
ment without defeating the exemption. This anomaly was not re-
solved in later case law.
The effects of Rule 147(e) are five fold: the subjective consid-
eration of "investment intent" is entirely eliminated; the consider-
ation of time elapsed is now measured from the last sale of the
issuer until resale, rather than from the date of initial offering until
resale, thereby providing for consistent treatment of distributions
spanning varying lengths of time; the consideration of time elapsed
between completion of the distribution and resale is elevated from
presumption of fact to canon of law; the period is shortened to nine
months from the one-year period of Brooklyn Manhattan Transit
and the proposed rule; and the limitation, unlike previous holdings
and the original proposal, is made applicable to sales only, rather
than to offers and sales, to facilitate enforcement. 171
With respect to the notes to Section (e), the treatment of sales
of convertibles in the same manner as sales of present equity inter-
ests, with no adverse repercussions at conversion, is supported by
reason, though no previous cases treated the issue. Although no
provision is made in the rule for the treatment of warrants and
options, Release 5450 specifies that exercise of both, where sales
have been made in reliance on the rule, will begin a new nine-
month period.'7 2 Effectively, then, exercise of an option is treated
like the purchase of a security. Thus, the SEC has given these re-
sale limitations the teeth necessary to pierce the veil of any decep-
tive accounting practices which might be used to avoid the trading
strictures created in this section while observing its technical re-
quirements.
VU". PRECAUTIONS AGAINST INTERSTATE OFFERS AND SALES
Rule 147(f)1 7 3 requires issuers of intrastate distributions to take
certain measures to prevent violative sales and resales to nonresi-
170. Id. at 246.
171. Release 5450.
172. Id. at § 7.
173. Rule 147(f) provides:
Precautions Against Interstate Offers and Sales.
(1) The issuer shall, in connection with any securities sold by
it pursuant to this rule:
(i) place a legend on the certificate or other document evi-
dencing the security stating that the securities have not
been registered under the Act and setting forth the limita-
tions on resale contained in paragraph (e);
dents. In connection with each offer and sale, the issuer must dis-
close in writing both the limitations on resale and the precautions
against interstate offers and sales here discussed. Furthermore, in
connection with both sales of securities and the issuing of new cer-
tificates for securities which are part of an issue distributed pur-
suant to the rule, the issuer must perform the following: he must
affix to the certificate a legend stating that the security is unregis-
tered; he must issue stop transfer instructions to his transfer agent
with respect to the securities; and he must obtain a written repre-
sentation as to the residence of each purchaser.
Section (f) represents no radical break from either trade prac-
tice or the course of SEC policy development. The SEC has long
required disclosure of the unregistered character of securities in any
advertisement for an intrastate offering delivered through the
mails or printed in a newspaper with interstate distribution, on the
grounds that absence of such disclosure is prima facie evidence of
violative interstate offers.
17 4
Although previously, as now, the observance of precautions did
not serve to lessen the issuer's liability as an insurer against trans-
fers violative of 3(a) (11) and SEC mandates, many issuers em-
ployed descriptive legends and written representations of a pur-
chaser's residence to reduce the risk of violative sales. 1T5 The SEC
in 1970 announced it would henceforth consider the use or non-
use of restrictive legends and stop transfer instructions in determin-
ing the availability of the similar private offering exemption. 76
Clearly Section (f) is in accord with these precedents.
The SEC's adoption of mandatory precautions has the signifi-
cant effect of rendering Section 3(a) (11) a conditional exemption.
Previously this section merely established prohibitions with respect
to the respective characters of the issuer, the purchaser, and the
(ii) issue stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer
agent, if any, with respect to the securities, or, if the issuer
transfers its own securities, make a notation in the appro-
priate records of the issuer; and
(iii) obtain a written representation from each purchaser
as to his residence.
(2) The issuer shall, in connection with the issuance of new
certificates for any of the securities that are part of the same issue
that are presented for transfer during the time period specified in
paragraph (e), take the steps required by subsections (f) (1) (i)
and (ii).
(3) The issuer shall, in connection with any offers, offers to
sell, offers for sale or sales by it pursuant to this rule, disclose in
writing, the limitations on resale contained in paragraph (e) and
the provisions of subsections (f) (1) (i) and (ii) and subparagraph
(f) (2).
174. See note 26 supra.
175. Release 4434; Schneider, The Intrastate Offering Exemption, in
SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 22, 37 (R. Mundheim
& A. Fleischer, Jr. ed. 1971).
176. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (December 30, 1970), 1 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,943.
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peculiar issue with which their transactions were concerned. Sec-
tion (f), however, requires of the issuer the performance of a dis-
crete act prior to and in addition to his issuance of securities, and
it conditions there on the availability of the intrastate exemption.
One of the primary effects of this development will be to end the
use of Section 3(a) (11) as a wastebasket provision by issuers who
in the past distributed unregistered securities without regard for
the requirements of the Act, and tried to frame their distributions




Section 3(a) (11) began as a rather vague exemption from SEC
registration for issuers distributing securities intrastate whose ac-
tivities were being administered by state securities commissions.
However, large issuers, predominantly interstate in character but
seeking a refuge from federal jurisdiction, were attracted by the
imprecise requirements of the provision. The SEC and the federal
courts, wishing to resurrect the grail of investor protection, curbed
abuses by supplementing the ambiguous terms with tortured and
occasionally inconsistent interpretations. However, this effort, al-
though it protected the intrastate exemption from potential abus-
ers, rendered it at the same time too narrow and uncertain for prac-
tical use by the many local issuers whom Congress had intended
to benefit.
Rule 147 replaces subjective homily with objective criteria for
the determination of the primary requirements of Section 3(a) (11):
that the parties to the transaction be residents in the state of the
issue; that the issuer be doing business in the same state; that the
whole issue of which the contested security is a part come to rest
within the state before the commencement of resales to nonresi-
dents. Indisputably, Rule 147 effectively eliminates uncertainty in
the application of the exemption.
However, though the rule may be sufficiently precise, several
of its tenets are drawn from those same narrow judicial and ad-
ministrative interpretations which had rendered the exemption so
hazardous to issuers. In the first place, the requirement that the
issuer conduct eighty per cent of his business in his residence state
seems unnecessarily restrictive. In all the significant cases in this
area-Truckee,17 Chapman179 and McDonald' 80-the exemption
177. See Release 201.
178. 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
179. 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
180. SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1972).
would have been defeated by use of a far lower figure; these issuers
conducted the bulk of their business out of state. One writer prior
to adoption of the Rule suggested an objective standard of fifty-
one per cent.'81
Second, although the issuer must observe a host of precautions
to prevent resale out of state, his status under the rule and the
Act is not improved thereby; he remains an insurer of his purchasers'
residence within the state. Conceding the impracticality of subj ect-
ing the corporate personality to psychological analysis, no "good
faith" standard could be workable. However, it is submitted that
fulfillment by the issuer of all requisite precautions should act to
bar civil liability for sales to nonresidents; or, if this seems too per-
missive, observance of the precautions should serve to limit the is-
suer's civil liability to recission of the out-of-state sales only. The
author believes that only by such measures can the SEC restore
the intrastate exemption to its position as a safe and useful tool
by which issuers conducting substantially local enterprises may im-
plement local public financing.
DAVID L. HoTcHuss
181. Emens & Thomas, The Intrastate Exemption of the Securities Act
of 1933 in 1971, 40 U. Cn. L. REv. 779, 793 (1971).
